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Abstract
Research showing how upward social comparison breeds competitive behavior has so far conﬂated local comparisons in task
performance (e.g. a test score) with comparisons on a more general scale (i.e. an underlying skill). Using a ranking methodology
(Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006) to separate task and scale comparisons, Studies 1–2 reveal that an upward comparison on the scale
(e.g. being surpassed in rank), rather than in the mere task (e.g., being outperformed), is necessary to generate competition among
rivals proximate to a standard (e.g. ranked #3 vs. 4, near ‘‘the top’’); rivals far from a standard (e.g. ranked #203 vs. 204), on the
other hand, still tend to cooperate. Study 3 illustrates this ﬁnding with player trades in Major League Baseball. Study 4 further
shows how an implicit scale comparison, instead of the commonly assumed explicit task comparison, may account for those classical
competition ﬁndings in the literature. Study 5 then reveals how scale ranking becomes all important in the proximity of a standard,
leading rivals to tolerate even an upward scale comparison to increase their proximity to the standard. Implications for the increasingly popular ‘‘forced ranking’’ management systems (e.g., at General Electric) are also discussed.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Decision making; Choice behavior; Social comparison; Competition; Rankings; Behavioral economics

Introduction
Competitive behavior is a common consequence of
social comparison processes (Festinger, 1942; Festinger,
1954; Hoﬀman, Festinger, & Lawrence, 1954; Whittemore, 1924, 1925), and researchers have shown that
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the relationship between upward comparison and competitive behavior depends on the relevance of the dimension on which the comparison occurs and the
commensurability and closeness of the comparison counterparts (e.g., Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988,
1980). An extensive set of studies by Garcia et al.
(2006) further reveals that the intensity of competition
among rivals also depends on an additional variable—
namely, their proximity to a meaningful standard. This
impact of standards on competitive behavior holds,
moreover, even while controlling for relevance, commensurability, and closeness. Using rankings to track
rivals’ proximity to a standard, Garcia et al. show that
competitive behavior increases as decision makers get
closer to a standard. Rivals ranked #3 and #4 on the
Fortune 500 (near ‘‘the top’’ standard), for example, will
tend to behave more competitively and become less willing to maximize joint gains. Rivals not proximate to a
standard, such as those ranked #103 and #104, on the
other hand, will tend to maximize joint gains even in
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the face of an upward comparison. This phenomenon
generalizes, moreover, to meaningful standards other
than the top rank, similarly making rivals at the bottom
of the Fortune 500, for instance, more competitive and
less willing to maximize joint gains.
Building on these ﬁndings, the present analysis
advances our theoretical understanding of this social
comparison—competition link by introducing a conceptual distinction between an upward comparison in the
task versus an upward comparison on the scale, two levels of comparison that previous social comparison
research from Festinger (e.g., Festinger, 1954) onwards
has failed to disentangle (Garcia et al., 2006; Goethals
& Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988; Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999). Task comparisons concern relative outcomes
or standing in speciﬁc tasks, such as the anticipated
earnings of one’s company versus a partner company
in a joint business venture. Scale comparisons, on the
other hand, such as those concerning companies’ standing on annual earnings, occur at a more general level.
Task performance and scale standing are related, but
imperfectly correlated. For instance, the proﬁts obtained
by one’s company from a given venture contribute to the
company’s annual earnings. Nevertheless, one’s company may obtain lower proﬁts from a given joint venture
with another company and still surpass it in annual
earnings. Task performance therefore provides a useful
but uncertain proxy for ultimate scale standing, which
is often unavailable.
Accordingly, we show that those standards that are
capable of determining the intensity of competition
may also be suﬃciently powerful to redeﬁne this competition altogether. In the proximity of standards,
competitors may focus their social comparison concerns on their relative ranking on the scale (e.g., annual earnings) rather than on their relative outcomes in
the mere task (e.g., venture earnings). We hypothesize
that in the proximity of standards the more general
and signiﬁcant upward comparisons on the scale can
trump upward comparisons in the task. This hypothesis clearly applies to those numerous situations involving explicit standards and ranking scales that permeate
our culture, from the ranking of companies in Fortune
magazine, through the ranking of academic institutions in U.S. News & World Report, to the ranking
of employees at ﬁrms such as General Electric (Grote,
2005).
The signiﬁcance of this hypothesis for social comparison theory is far broader, however, since it advances an
important and hitherto unrecognized distinction
between the task and scale levels of comparison processes. Moreover, the present analysis complements extant
research on the psychological consequences of competitive events (McGraw, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2005; Medvec,
Madey, & Gilovich, 1995) by shedding light on the antecedents of competitive behavior.

Upward comparison and competitive behavior
An upward social comparison of oneself to another
who does better on an important dimension is especially
painful (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Tesser, 1988; Tesser
& Smith, 1980) and can trigger competitive behavior.
Festinger (1954, p. 126) already noted that ‘‘competitive
behavior, action to protect one’s superiority, and even
some kinds of behavior that might be called cooperative,
are manifestations in the social process of these pressures’’ to reduce discrepancies. In a classical experiment
(Hoﬀman et al., 1954), after one of three participants
began scoring considerably well on a performance task,
the other two began to act in ways that were designed to
prevent the higher scorer from gaining additional points.
This competitive behavior apparently served to reduce
the relative diﬀerences in performance between the higher scorer and the lower ones.
Social comparison researchers have identiﬁed a number of variables that impact the relationship between
comparison and competitive behavior, most notably relevance, commensurability, and closeness. First, according
to the Self-Evaluation Maintenance Model (Tesser, 1988,
2000), upward comparison can be painful and increase
competitive behavior only when the dimension is relevant to the self. Otherwise, an upward comparison will
not foster competition. Second, the related attributes
hypothesis (Goethals, 1986; Goethals & Darley, 1977)
posits that competition is greatest when a comparison
counterpart is commensurate. For example, amateur
tennis players will feel more competitive towards other
amateurs than towards professional tennis players.
Finally, the closeness of a comparison counterpart usually increases competitive feelings. Thus, when the
dimension at hand is mutually relevant, competition
between friends is typically greater than between strangers (cf., Jones & Rachlin, 2006). For example, Tesser
and Smith (1980) paired acquainted or unacquainted
individuals in an interactive word identiﬁcation task
and gave them information that made task performance
appear either relevant or irrelevant to the valued dimension of verbal skill. The results showed that when performance appeared relevant to verbal skill acquainted
participants gave more diﬃcult clues to their partners
than did unacquainted participants.
Competition in the proximity of a standard
Recent ﬁndings, however, reveal proximity to a standard as an additional variable that moderates the degree
of competition between rivals (Garcia et al., 2006), independently of the relevance, commensurability, or closeness. For example, participants in one study were
asked to imagine being a CEO of a nonproﬁt organization and choose whether or not to enter a joint venture
with another nonproﬁt. With a joint venture, their
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donations would increase 10% and the other nonproﬁt’s
25%. Without a joint venture, donation income for both
nonproﬁts would only increase 5%. Rankings were also
used to manipulate proximity to a standard, as participants were told the two nonproﬁts were ranked either
#1 and #2 (i.e., highly ranked) or #101 and #102 (i.e.,
intermediately ranked) in terms of donation income.
This study found highly ranking participants less willing
than those of intermediate rank to maximize donation
income.
Garcia et al. (2006) also showed that the eﬀect of
proximity to a standard was not due to rational concerns about the potential long-term gains associated
with being ranked #1, but rather a result of social comparison processes. For instance, in a follow-up study
that provided no payoﬀ information, highly ranked participants still reported they would harbor more competitive feelings toward their rival than did their
intermediately ranked counterparts. The former also
rated more highly the pain of social comparison they
would experience if they were surpassed in rank than
did the latter, directly implicating the role of this variable in generating competitive behavior.
Additional studies by Garcia et al. (2006) also found
that the degree of competition linearly increases as rivals’ degree of proximity to a standard increases (e.g.,
comparing #25 vs. 26, #12 vs. 13, #6 vs. 7, and #3 vs.
4); that competitive feelings and behavior similarly
intensify in the proximity of various meaningful standards other than the top rank (e.g., #100 vs. 101 when
the top 100 get a bonus, or #500 on the Fortune 500
vs. 501—just oﬀ the list); and that it matters little
whether one is ranked just above or just below one’s
rival (e.g., #2 vs. 3 or #3 vs. 2). The results from two
additional studies further showed that proximity to a
standard has a direct impact on the basic ‘‘unidirectional
drive upward’’—that is, on the importance of doing
well. Garcia et al. (2006) therefore reject the notion that
people become more competitive in the proximity of a
standard because the perceived diﬀerence between high
ranks, for instance, appears much larger than the diﬀerence between intermediate ranks.
Untangling task and scale comparisons
Social comparison in the shadow of standards generates competitive behavior, but comparison processes
may lead to competition on two diﬀerent levels—in the
immediate task at hand and on the more general scale
that deﬁnes the standard. As mentioned earlier, comparisons in the task concern relative outcomes in speciﬁc
tasks, such as individuals’ relative performance on a test
or the anticipated earnings of one’s company versus
another company in a joint business venture. On the
other hand, comparisons on the scale—that is, on the
metric that deﬁnes the standard—occur at a more gener-
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al level. Such comparisons may concern, for instance,
individuals’ general verbal skill or companies’ annual
earnings.
Social comparisons frequently involve comparisons
both in the task and on the scale, although comparisons
on the scale may be neither explicit nor always distinct
from comparisons in the task. For instance, classical
competition studies—such as Hoﬀman et al..’s (1954)
performance task or the later Tesser and Smith (1980)
‘‘verbal skill’’ task—did not distinguish upward comparisons in the speciﬁc task from the upward comparisons
on the scale that participants’ relative task performance
implied. Thus, Tesser and Smith’s (1980) participants
may have acted competitively in the face of threatening
comparisons in the test task they were given, because of
the implications for their relative standing on the more
general and important underlying verbal skill.
The Garcia et al. (2006) ranking studies described
above, on the other hand, make the distinction between
the task and scale levels more readily apparent. At one
level, participants wishing to maximize proﬁts were
faced with a certain upward comparison in the task,
such as getting paid less than their rival. At another
level, however, they were faced with the threat of an
upward comparison on the ranking scale itself—that
is, with the possibility of being surpassed in rank. Nevertheless, the Garcia et al.’s (2006) studies, like social
comparison research more generally, still conﬂated the
eﬀects of the task and scale levels. In their studies, an
upward comparison in the task always implied a threat
of an upward comparison on the scale. For instance, a
decision to forego proﬁt maximization to avoid an
upward comparison in the task also avoided the risk
that the rival would surpass the self on the ranking scale
of total earnings.
This pervasive confounding of task and scale comparisons in the literature raises a number of intriguing questions. What would happen, for instance, if an upward
comparison in the task were to pose no scale threat?
Would social comparison concerns at the level of the
task alone suﬃce to generate competitive behavior at
the expense of proﬁt maximization, or would a threat
to one’s relative standing on the scale itself be necessary
to generate such competitive behavior?
If the accepted wisdom on upward comparison is taken to suggest that an upward comparison in the task
should suﬃce to generate competitive behavior (Festinger, 1954; Tesser, 1988; Stanne et al., 1999), we disagree.
Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that the dramatically
increased competitiveness exhibited by Garcia et al.’s
(2006) participants in the proximity of standards may
reﬂect a shift among highly ranked rivals to competition
over relative standing on the very ranking scale from
competition over relative standing in the mere task
alone. We thus propose that in the proximity of a standard the threat of an upward comparison on the scale,
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rather than in the task, becomes the main facilitator of
competitive behavior. Farther away from the standard,
on the other hand, where the intensity of competition
diminishes, neither upward comparisons in the task
nor upward comparisons on the scale are suﬃciently
threatening to incite competition at the expense of proﬁt
maximization.
Overview
Using a decision-making methodology, we examined
whether competitive behavior occurs following an
upward comparison in the task that is either coupled
or not coupled with an upward comparison on the scale.
We predicted that rivals in the proximity of a standard
(e.g., ranked #2 and #3) would be less willing to accept
an upward comparison in the task (e.g., less willing to
trade disadvantageous inequality for extra proﬁt), only
when it coincided with an upward comparison on the
scale. Rivals who are far from a standard (e.g., #202
and #203), however, would accept an upward comparison in the task for extra proﬁt, regardless of whether it
coincided with an upward comparison on the scale. To
ensure that rivals were commensurate (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Wheeler, 1966), paired rivals always occupied
two contiguous ranks.
Studies 1 and 2 separated task and scale comparisons
and tested our main hypothesis, using the tradeoﬀ
between proﬁt and inequality as a measure of competition (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Garcia, Tor, Bazerman, & Miller, 2005). Study 3 tested the
hypothesis using ﬁeld data on the willingness to trade
players in Major League Baseball. Study 4 extended
the task versus scale results of Studies 1–3 empirically
to link them to classical social comparison research, suggesting that it is in fact the upward comparison on the
scale, rather than in the mere task, that generates competitive behavior. Finally, Study 5 tested the hypothesis
that competitors proximate to a standard will even tolerate an upward comparison on the scale, as long as it
improves their absolute scale standing by bringing them
closer to the standard.

Study 1: Task vs. Scale Comparisons
While competitive behavior is manifested in numerous ways, the present analysis builds on a research
stream that uses a decision making methodology to
examine competitive behavior through choices between
alternative payoﬀ structures (e.g., Axelrod & Dion,
1988; Brickman, 1975; Kelly & Thibaut, 1978; Messick
& Sentis, 1979; Messick & Thorngate, 1967; Turner,
Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). Speciﬁcally, we examine how
individuals trade oﬀ social comparison concerns of disadvantageous inequality against extra proﬁt (Bazerman

et al., 1992; Bazerman, Schroth, Shah, Diekmann, &
Tenbrunsel, 1994; Bazerman, White, & Loewenstein,
1995; Blount & Bazerman, 1996; Garcia et al., 2005).
In a typical study using this methodology, participants
make hypothetical choices between being paid an
amount equal to that paid to another individual (e.g.,
self—$500/other—$500) and a more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal amount (e.g., self—$600/other—
$800). Individuals who willingly forgo social comparison concerns for extra proﬁt choose the latter payoﬀ
(Bazerman et al., 1992), whereas competitive behavior
is manifested in the proﬁt-sacriﬁcing choice of the suboptimal, but equal, payoﬀ option.
Study 1 disentangles the task and scale levels of comparison, by manipulating the presence of an upward
comparison on the scale while holding ﬁxed the upward
comparison in the task. Study 1 thus tested the prediction that commensurate rivals who are proximate to
‘‘the top’’ standard (e.g., ranked #2 and #3) will maximize proﬁts less often than rivals ranked farther away
from this standard (e.g., #202 and #203), but only when
the upward comparison in the task coincided with an
upward comparison on the scale. We also predicted that
when the comparison in the task does not coincide with
the comparison on the scale, rivals will behave more
cooperatively and maximize proﬁts, regardless of proximity. In the present study, the task concerned the percentage increase in earnings, while the scale referred to
one’s overall tournament ranking.
Participants
A total of 88 undergraduates from the University of
Michigan participated in a survey. A total of 20 were
recruited at the library. An additional 68 were recruited
by e-mail from a larger pool of 200 e-mail addresses
which were randomly selected from the student directory. The response rate was approximately 32 percent.
Procedure
In a mixed-factorial design, participants were
assigned to either a scale comparison condition or a no
scale comparison condition. In a survey entitled ‘‘Poker
Strategy,’’ participants in the scale comparison condition
read, ‘‘Imagine that you are playing in a one-day poker
tournament with 500 players. Before the ﬁnal round,
you are deciding whether or not to practice with one
of your rivals.’’ Participants then saw two options:
‘‘Strategy A: if you decide not to practice, your tournament earnings will increase by 5% and your rival’s by
5%—OR—Strategy B: if you practice with your rival,
your tournament earnings will increase by 10% and your
rival’s by 25%. However, your rival will surpass you in
the rankings.’’ At this point, participants responded to
two randomly ordered questions that varied the rank
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(a within-subject factor): ‘‘If before the ﬁnal round your
rank is #1 [#101] in tournament earnings and your rival’s is #2 [#102], which strategy would you pursue?’’
Participants in the no scale comparison condition read
an identical scenario, except that Strategy B stated that
their relative standing on the scale was not in jeopardy.
Results and discussion
We collapsed the data across administration sites
because it made no diﬀerence whether the participants
were recruited in person or online (VENUE · SCALE · RANK: v2(1) = 0.2, p = .89). To test
our prediction that competitive behavior would increase
with the rivals’ proximity to ‘‘the top’’ standard when
the rivals’ relative standing on the scale was threatened
but not when the rivals’ relative standing was not in
jeopardy or when the rivals were far from the ‘‘the
top,’’ we conducted a binary logistic regression with
the following contrast weights (Rosenthal & Rosnow,
1991): 3 (scale comparison—high ranking condition), 1
(scale comparison—intermediate ranking condition),
1 (no scale comparison—high ranking condition), and
1 (no scale comparison—intermediate ranking condition). Indeed, the logistic regression was signiﬁcant (Bvalue = .58, Wald = 34.1, p < .001) and consistent
with the prediction. When faced with an upward comparison on the scale, only 25 percent of the participants
maximized joint gains when they and their rivals were
ranked #1 and #2, compared to 79 percent when they
and their rivals were ranked #101 and #102. A followup planned comparison on this latter pattern was significant (v2(1) = 28.2, p < .001). However, in the absence of
a scale threat, participants uniformly behaved more
cooperatively, with 74 percent maximizing joint gains
when ranked #1 and #2 and 77 percent when ranked
#101 and #102. A follow-up planned comparison
showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p > .79). See Fig. 1.
These ﬁndings suggest that an upward comparison on
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the scale, rather than in the task alone, is a necessary
precondition for competitive behavior in the proximity
of a standard. When a standard is not proximate, however, its inﬂuence diminishes altogether and rivals are
more willing to cooperate to maximize joint gains even
in the face of an upward comparison on the scale. While
Study 1 illustrates the central hypothesis in a hypothetical game of poker, Study 2 attempts to demonstrate the
eﬀect in a more worldly business context.

Study 2: Threat of a Scale Comparison
While Study 1 tested our basic hypothesis regarding
the role of scale comparisons with the common top-ofthe-scale standard, Study 2 generalizes these ﬁndings
in two respects. First, it shows standards elsewhere on
the scale to exert an eﬀect similar to that obtained near
the top. Second, it reveals that the threat—that is, a possibility—of an upward comparison on the scale suﬃces
to generate competitive behavior in the proximity of a
standard; a certain upward comparison on the scale is
not necessary. Study 2 manipulated the threat of an
upward comparison on the scale in the business context
of the Fortune 500. When relative scale standing is in
jeopardy, we hypothesized, rivals proximate to a standard—whether highly ranked (e.g., #2 vs. #3) or near
another valued standard (e.g., #500 on Fortune 500
vs. #501—just oﬀ the list), will behave more competitively on the task than rivals not proximate to a standard. However, when relative scale standing is not
threatened, individuals will tend to tolerate upward
comparisons in the task and behave more cooperatively
across scale locations.
Participants
A total of 42 undergraduates from the University of
Michigan participated in an online study. The response
rate was approximately 28 percent from a pool of 150
randomly selected e-mail addresses.

Percent Maximizing Joint Gains
100%

Procedure

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
#1 vs. #2

#101 vs. #102

Scale Comparison

#1 vs. #2

#101 vs. #102

No Scale Comparison

Fig. 1. Study 1: Percent maximizing joint gains by scale threat and
rankings.

In a mixed-factorial design, participants in the
between-subjects factor were assigned to either a scale
threat or a no scale threat condition. In a survey entitled
‘‘Business Strategy,’’ participants in the scale threat condition read, ‘‘Imagine that you are the CEO of a company on the Fortune 500—an honor that has brought your
company recognition—and you are thinking about a
possible joint venture with a rival company. Proﬁts will
depend on whether or not you enter the joint venture:
Strategy A: without a joint venture, your company’s
proﬁts will increase by 5% and the rival’s proﬁts will
increase by 5%—OR—Strategy B: with a joint venture,
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your company’s proﬁts will increase by 10% and the rival’s proﬁts will increase by 25% (and this WILL threaten
your rank relative to your rival).’’ At this point, participants responded to three randomly ordered questions
varying the within-subjects factor of rank: ‘‘If your company is RANKED #2 [#231] [#500] on the Fortune 500
and the rival company is RANKED #3 [#232] [#501,
making it oﬀ the list], which option would you choose?’’
Participants then chose ‘‘Strategy A’’ or ‘‘B.’’ Participants in the no scale threat condition read the identical
scenario, except that Strategy B was revised to say
‘‘(and this WILL NOT in any way threaten your rank
relative to your rival).’’
Results and discussion
To test our prediction, we conducted a binary logistic
regression with the following contrast weights (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991): 2 (scale threat—high ranking condition),
1 (scale threat—intermediate ranking
condition), 2 (scale threat—bottom ranking condition),
1 (no scale threat—high ranking condition), 1 (no
scale threat—intermediate ranking condition), and 1
(no scale threat—bottom ranking condition). The pattern
was signiﬁcant (B-value = .67, Wald = 22.5, p < .001)
and consistent with our prediction. In the scale threat
condition, the predicted U-shaped pattern emerged: only
35 percent in the high rankings condition and only 13
percent in the bottom rankings condition maximized
proﬁt, compared to 70 percent in the intermediate rankings condition. Planned comparisons also revealed that
the high rankings (v2(1) = 5.58, p < .05) and bottom
rankings (v2(1) = 15.2, p < .001) were both signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the intermediate rankings condition.
However, when the threat of upward comparison on
the scale was removed in the no scale threat condition,

participants tended maximize joint gains across all ranking levels: a total of 68 percent in the high rankings, 79
percent in the intermediate rankings, and 63 percent in
the bottom rankings condition maximized proﬁt. These
ranking levels were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other (all p’s > .28), and planned comparisons showed
further that the high rankings in the scale and no scale
threat conditions were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other (v2(1) = 4.7, p < .05), as were the bottom rankings
in these two conditions (v2(1) = 11.4, p < .01). See
Fig. 2.
The results of Study 2 therefore suggest that proximity to any meaningful standard can generate competitive
behavior, and that a mere threat—rather than a certainty—of an upward comparison on the scale suﬃces to
trigger competitive behavior when rivals are proximate
to a standard. At the same time, rivals distant from a
standard behave more cooperatively in the face of
upward comparison on either task or scale. Moreover,
these ﬁndings are not explained by demand characteristics in the design of Study 2 (i.e., the emphasis on
‘‘WILL’’/‘‘WILL NOT’’), since we observe systematic
diﬀerences across the ranking conditions.
Importantly, one might perceive the results of Study 2
to have been driven by participants’ fairness-oriented
concerns for equality (e.g., De Dreu & Boles, 1998;
Mclean Parks et al., 1996; Pillutla & Murnighan,
2003), when faced with the choice between an equal payoﬀ versus a disadvantageously unequal one. However,
this perception is misguided for a number of reasons.
First, the trade oﬀ measure used in Studies 1–2 was previously validated by Garcia et al. (2006), who carefully
linked the tradeoﬀ of proﬁt and disadvantageous
inequality with competition through multiple measures,
such as ratings of the pain of social comparison and ratings of competitive feelings. Second and related, similar

Percent Maximizing Joint Gains
100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
#2 vs. #3

#231 vs. #232 #500 vs. #501
Scale Threat

#2 vs. #3

#231 vs. #232 #500 vs. #501
No Scale Threat

Fig. 2. Study 2: Percent maximizing joint gains by scale threat and rankings.
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tradeoﬀs were correlated with ratings of the pain of
social comparison in individual judgments of competitive situations between groups as well (Garcia et al.,
2005). Third, it would be diﬃcult to argue that equality
norms become especially salient under the scale threat
conditions of Study 2. In this study, threat was the
between-subjects factor, while rank constituted the within-subjects factor. The results we observe, however,
reveal diﬀerential responses across the three levels of
rank in the presence of scale threat, a pattern that a noncompetitive concern with equality norms would hardly
predict.
Nevertheless, Study 3 harnesses a real-world measure
of competition—namely, the willingness to trade with
competitors—to establish further the robustness of our
experimental ﬁndings. This study also provides the additional beneﬁt of extending our individual-level ﬁndings
to the organizational decision making of baseball teams.

Study 3: Competition in the (baseball) ﬁeld
The preceding studies show that people become
more competitive in the proximity of a standard, but
only when there is the threat of upward comparison
on the scale, rather than in the task alone. Study 3 tests
this hypothesis using real world data from Major League Baseball. Baseball teams trade players annually,
and the more outstanding players among these clearly
pose a greater threat to the trading team’s ultimate
scale standing (‘‘Scale Threat Players’’) than their other
traded peers. We predicted that highly ranked teams
will be less likely to trade high scale threat players with
commensurate rivals—that is, with other highly ranked
teams—compared to teams that are not highly ranked,
which were expected to be less concerned with scale
threat. We therefore expected to observe an inverse
correlation between the rank of the old team (when
higher ranks are assigned lower numerical values) and
the absolute distance to the new team. In other words,
the higher the rank of the old team, the greater the
absolute distance in rank between the old and the
new team was expected to be. For instance, a #1
ranked team will be more likely to trade away a ‘‘star’’
high scale threat player to another team that is ranked
#20 than to a team ranked #2. On the other hand, we
also predicted that this inverse correlation between old
team rank and absolute distance to the new team will
disappear for those low scale threat players, which even
highly ranked teams should be willing to trade with
each other.
Method
Data. We collected data on the placement of traded
players from November 10, 2005 through February 28,
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2006. This interval—the 2005 post-season through
2006 pre-season—spans the timeframe where 2005 season player performance statistics are most relevant
(e.g., after the 2005 season statistics have been compiled
and just before the tracking of new 2006 performance
statistics began). The available data from ESPN.com
and MLB4U.com included the name of the player’s
old team, name of the new team, transaction date,
2005 season earned-run average (if traded player was a
pitcher), 2005 season batting average (if traded player
was not a pitcher), trading context (post-season/early
pre-season), and age. However, salary data for many
of these traded players was undisclosed. We were also
able to obtain the ESPN Power Ranking (‘‘PWR’’) for
the 30 teams in Major League Baseball for the 2005 season (from ESPN.com’s Major League Baseball RPI
Rankings; see ESPN, 2006), to determine the rank of
the player’s old and new team. Only those 76 traded
players with at least one year of experience (and thus
with 2005 performance statistics) were included in the
analysis.
Scale threat. We used either the 2005 season earnedrun average (ERA) or batting average as a proxy for
scale threat, based on the assumption that players who
performed extraordinarily well are those who pose such
a threat. Players with substantially weaker performance
were assumed to have minimal, if any, individual impact
on team standing and therefore to pose no scale threat.
We standardized the batting average (higher values
mean better performance) and standardized as well as
inversely coded the ERA (lower values mean better performance) to create a single performance index. To
establish the presence or absence of scale threat as
manipulated in our experimental paradigm, players
who were in the top 33% in performance were designated
high scale threat, whereas those in the bottom 33% in
performance were considered low scale threat.
Distance to new team. To calculate the distance in
rank from the old team to the new one for each traded
player, we calculated the absolute value of the diﬀerence
in rank between the old and new teams.
Results and discussion
We correlated the rank of the old team and distance to
new team among the high scale threat and low scale
threat players respectively, to test the hypothesis that
highly ranked teams will be less likely to trade with
other highly ranked teams under scale threat. Hence,
the more highly ranked the team, the greater the predicted distance high scale threat players will travel to their
new teams. The results indeed showed a signiﬁcant
inverse correlation between rank of the old team and distance to new team for this group of players (r = .46,
p < .05, n = 21), controlling for transaction date, measure of ability (ERA/batting average), trading context
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(post-season/early pre-season), and age. This result
reveals that highly ranked teams are less likely to trade
those players who pose a threat to their standing on
the ranking scale with other highly ranked teams. To
test the prediction that this competitive trading behavior
disappears under conditions of low scale threat, we conducted the same analysis among low scale threat players.
There was no signiﬁcant correlation between the rank of
the old team and distance (r = .13, p = .53, n = 23), when
controlling for the aforementioned variables.
While these results are consistent with the prediction,
our measure for scale threat is inevitably imperfect.
First, we operationalized the top and bottom 33% of
players as high and low scale threat, respectively. The
choice of any given percentage threshold for ‘‘high’’
and ‘‘low’’ threat is necessarily arbitrary, but was meant
to dichotomize the trading context in which scale threat
was present or absent, consistent with our experimental
manipulations. Second, because better proxies were
unavailable, we combined two sets of statistics, which
were the most relevant for pitchers and batters respectively. Nevertheless, we readily acknowledge that there
are diﬀerent perspectives among baseball professionals
and observers regarding whether the batting average,
runners batted in (RBI), slugging percentage, or some
combination of these variables best measures a batter’s
potential. Most importantly, we are not privy to the
methods for evaluating ‘‘scale threat’’ that baseball
managers and teams rely on, methods that may well
involve a weighted formula that takes into account multiple seasons of play and any number of additional variables. It is precisely these subjective methods, however,
that determine the trading preferences of managers
and teams that contribute to the trading patterns we
observe in the data. Finally, we were unable to control
for traded players’ salary ﬁgures, since this information
is often publicly unavailable, and the commensurability
of the rivals, since this data was based on actual trades.
Despite these obvious limitations, however, we believe
the results of Study 3 corroborate the proposition that,
in the presence of scale threat, highly ranked teams
become more competitive and thus less willing to trade
high impact players with each other compared to intermediately ranked teams. At the same time, commensurate rivals are more willing to trade with each other
low scale threat players, regardless of rank. Diehard
baseball fans, of course, would not be surprised by our
results: many Red Sox fans still lament the trading of
Babe Ruth to the Yankees soon after the team’s 5th
World Series title in 1918.

Study 4: Implicit Scale Threat
While Studies 1 and 2 showed that upward scale comparison in the proximity of a standard leads to compet-

itive behavior, Study 3 illustrated these dynamics in the
real-world setting of Major League Baseball. We next
integrate these ﬁndings with classical competition
research. As mentioned earlier, many important studies
on competition (e.g., Hoﬀman et al., 1954; Tesser &
Smith, 1980) conﬂated the task and scale levels of comparison. Study 4 therefore recreated a classical competition condition in which paired rivals were made
commensurate without explicitly providing ranking
information, using a within-subjects design. We ﬁrst
examined whether participants would choose proﬁt
maximization in the face of a typical upward comparison that conﬂates the task and scale levels of comparison. Thereafter, participants were presented with
additional information about their high ranking, faced
with an upward comparison on the scale, and asked to
choose a strategy. Finally, participants were asked to
choose whether to maximize proﬁts in the face of an
upward comparison in the task alone, without the threat
of a comparison on the scale.
This within-subjects design enabled us directly to test
whether the increased intensity of competition is similar
when task and scale are conﬂated compared to when
upward comparison on the scale is explicitly present
for rivals proximate to a standard. We also predicted
this increased competition would be signiﬁcantly greater
than the competition observed when the upward comparison on the scale is removed and only an upward
comparison in the task remains.
Participants
A total of 36 undergraduates from Michigan State
University volunteered to participate in a survey conducted at the library.
Procedure
In a within-subjects design, all participants responded
to a three-page survey about a modiﬁed version of the
‘‘Poker Tournament’’ scenario. The classical competition
condition appeared on page 1 and underscored the commensurability of the rivals without mentioning rank:
‘‘Imagine that you are playing in a one-day poker tournament with 500 players. Before the ﬁnal round, you are
deciding whether or not to practice with your arch-rival.
Your and your arch-rival’s earnings are approximately
equal just before this ﬁnal round. Strategy A: if you
decide not to practice, your tournament earnings will
increase by 5% and your rival’s by 5%—OR—Strategy
B: if you practice with your rival, your tournament earnings will increase by 10% and your rival’s by 25%.’’ Participants then selected ‘‘Strategy A’’ or ‘‘Strategy B.’’
On page 2, the scale comparison—high ranking condition read, ‘‘Now suppose that, before the ﬁnal round,
you are told that you are ranked #3 in tournament
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Fig. 3. Study 4: Percent maximizing joint gains by condition.

earnings, and your arch-rival is ranked #4. . .’’ Strategy
A also added, ‘‘Your ranks will remain the same’’ and
Strategy B added, ‘‘However, your rival will surpass
you in the rankings.’’ On page 3, the no scale comparison—high ranking condition read, ‘‘Now suppose that,
before the ﬁnal round, you are told that you are ranked
#3 in tournament earnings, and your arch-rival is
ranked #4 but Strategy B will not aﬀect your rank.’’
Strategy B added the modiﬁcation, ‘‘However, your
rival will NOT surpass you in the rankings.’’
Results and discussion
To test our prediction, we conducted a binary logistic
regression with the following contrast weights (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991): 1 (classical competition condition), 1 (scale comparison—high ranking condition), and
2 (no scale comparison—high ranking condition). The
pattern of results was signiﬁcant (B-value = .62,
Wald = 16.9, p < .001) and consistent with the prediction. Only 33 percent in the classic competition and only
19 percent in the scale comparison—high ranking conditions maximized proﬁt, compared to 69 percent in the
no scale comparison—high ranking condition. Followup planned comparisons further revealed that participants’ responses in both the classical competition and
scale comparison—high ranking conditions, which were
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (p > .18), were
signiﬁcantly more competitive than those in the no scale
comparison—high ranking condition (v2(1) = 9.4, p < .01
and v2(1) = 18.2, p < .001, respectively). See Fig. 3.
These results suggest that the implicit threat of
upward scale comparison, rather than the mere upward
task comparison, may have been the main driver of competition in the classic studies on competition (e.g., Hoﬀman et al., 1954; Tesser & Smith, 1980), where task and
scale were confounded. We also note that the withinsubjects ﬁndings here are unlikely to reﬂect an order

eﬀect or priming eﬀect, since all participants were ﬁrst
exposed to the classical competition condition. The pattern exhibited in subsequent conditions, moreover,
resembled the mixed-factorial and ﬁeld results of Studies
1 – 3, suggesting that an early exposure to the classical
competition condition did not signiﬁcantly impact participants’ preferences. Finally, for the reason decision
making researchers often ﬁnd within-subjects designs
compelling (cf. Camerer, 1995), Study 4 reveals how
the very participants who behaved competitively in the
classical competition and scale comparison—high ranking
conditions, became more cooperative when the threat of
upward comparison on the scale was removed. It therefore appears that the implicit possibility that participants’ scale locations are proximate to a standard and
that these relative locations are under threat as a result
of an upward comparison in the task is an important
driver of the results in the classical competition condition.

Study 5: Social Comparison vs. Self-Evaluation
The preceding analysis showed that upward comparison in the task alone is insuﬃcient to generate competitive behavior at the expense of proﬁt maximization;
individuals must also be threatened by a potential
upward comparison on the scale in the proximity of a
standard. However, since studies 1-4 make the impact
of standards on social comparison abundantly clear,
Study 5 sought further to examine the power of standards to shape competitive behavior via comparison
processes. While the ‘‘unidirectional drive upward’’ is
a basic motivation of social comparison processes, its
underlying purpose serves to quench the fundamental
motivation of social comparison theory: the need for
self-evaluation (Hypothesis 1, Festinger, 1954). Because
standards themselves deﬁne the criterions by which people evaluate themselves and embody the implied goal of
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the upward drive, we hypothesized that standards capable of exerting such a powerful eﬀect on the ‘‘unidirectional drive upward’’ of social comparison may also
become important targets for comparison in themselves.
If this is the case, those most competitive rivals, who are
proximate to a standard, might accept even a painful
upward comparison on the scale to increase their absolute proximity to the standard—the criterion by which
self-evaluations are made. For instance, decision makers
ranked #4 may be willing to cooperate with #5, even if
the latter were consequently to surpass them and achieve
a #2 rank, to increase their absolute proximity to the
standard and become #3. Study 5 therefore tests the prediction that rivals who are proximate to the standard
will trade disadvantageous inequality for extra proﬁt
and tolerate even an upward comparison on the scale
if they simultaneously improve their absolute standing
on that scale.
Participants
A total of 54 undergraduates from the University of
Michigan participated in an online study. The response
rate was approximately 30 percent.
Procedure
In a between-subjects design, based on the poker scenario, participants read one of two conditions in which
they and their rivals were proximate to a standard. The
high ranking control condition stated: ‘‘Before the ﬁnal
round, you are ranked #5 in tournament earnings, and
you are deciding whether or not to practice with one
of your rivals who is ranked #6. Strategy A: if you
decide not to practice, your tournament earnings will
increase by 5% and your rival’s by 5% Your ranks will
remain the same. Strategy B: if you practice with your
rival, your tournament earnings will increase by 10%
and your rival’s by 25%. However, your rival will surpass you in the rankings. Which strategy would you pursue?’’ The closer-to-standard condition was identical,
except Strategy B was qualiﬁed: ‘‘. . . although your rival
will surpass you in the rankings, your overall rank will
also increase to #3 and your rival’s to #2.’’
Results and discussion
The pattern of results was consistent with the prediction and signiﬁcant (v2 = 9.72, p < .01). Only 35 percent
of the participants in the high ranking control condition
faced the alternative of an upward comparison on the
scale in order to maximize joint gains. However, 78 percent of the participants in the closer-to-standard condition maximized joint gains, accepting the upward
comparison on the scale (as well as in the task), to
increase their proximity to the standard. Study 5 thus

suggests that even a painful upward comparison on
the scale may be tolerable if it simultaneously brings
one absolutely closer to the standard. While the ‘‘unidirectional drive upward’’ is an important motivation in
competition, it serves the fundamental need for self-evaluation (Hypothesis 1, Festinger, 1954). Accordingly, the
power of standards–criterions on which self-evaluations
are based—to shape competition in their proximity is far
reaching: apparently, in the proximity of standards,
absolute scale standing becomes such an important
means for self-evaluation that rivals may willingly
accept a painful upward comparison on the scale in
order to improve their absolute standing. Indeed, this
circumstance captures well what Festinger (1954) said
long ago, ‘‘when an objective, nonsocial basis for evaluation of one’s ability or opinion is readily available, persons will not evaluate their opinions or abilities by
comparison with others’’ (Corollary IIB). Thus, when
a standard is at hand, the comparison of oneself to the
standard trumps any comparison of oneself to a reference person.

General discussion
Classical competition studies in the social comparison
literature (e.g., Hoﬀman et al., 1954; Tesser & Smith,
1980) have generally conﬂated comparisons in speciﬁc
tasks (e.g. performance on a test) and comparisons on
the underlying scales (e.g. actual verbal skill). It may
be, therefore, that participants in these classical studies
behaved competitively to avoid painful social comparison concerns on the underlying scale instead of in the
speciﬁc task, as the literature commonly assumed. These
participants may well have treated the information they
received on relative task performance as indicative of
their implicit scale standing—the main focus of their
comparison concerns—since the two levels are typically
correlated. After all, task performance often contributes
directly to scale standing. This would be the relationship, for instance, between the outcomes of a given
match and the overall ranking of professional tennis
players, or between the proﬁtability of a speciﬁc business
transaction and the annual proﬁts of a business. In other
cases, the task may simply provide a proxy for the
underlying scale standing that is unobservable or otherwise unknown. The task vs. scale distinction thus calls
for a reinterpretation of the role of social comparison
processes in classical competition ﬁndings.
Whereas the relevance of the dimension, commensurability, and closeness are established levers of competition in social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954;
Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988), recent research
adds proximity to a standard as a signiﬁcant moderator
of competitive behavior Garcia et al. (2006). Building
on these ﬁndings, the present studies manipulated
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upward comparisons on the scale, controlling for the
tradeoﬀ between proﬁtability and an upward comparison in the task. Studies 1–2 revealed that, in the proximity of a standard, upward comparisons on the scale, not
merely in the task, are the main facilitators of competition. Indeed, even rivals proximate to a standard—who
tend to behave most competitively—tended to prefer
proﬁtable but disadvantageous inequality once the
threat of an upward comparison on the scale was
removed. On the other hand, rivals distant from the
standard, who exhibit diminished social comparison
concerns, tended to maximize proﬁt regardless of an
upward comparison either in the task or on the scale.
Study 3 illustrated these dynamics with real-world data
on the patterns of player trading by teams in Major League Baseball. Study 4 used a within-subjects design further to conﬁrm that an implicit upward comparison on
the scale, rather than the mere comparison in the task,
is the important driver of competitive behavior in classical competition studies (e.g., Hoﬀman et al., 1954; Tesser & Smith, 1980). Finally, Study 5 revealed that even
those most competitive rivals who are proximate to a
standard may be willing to tolerate a painful upward
comparison on the scale to get closer to the standard—the pinnacle of self-evaluation.
The present set of studies thus advances our understanding of social comparison by, ﬁrst, clarifying the
important and hitherto unrecognized distinction
between comparisons in a speciﬁc task and on a more
general scale; second, by showing that it is the painful,
actual or potential, comparison on the scale (rather than
the mere task comparison as previously assumed by the
literature) that is the main social comparison facilitator
of competitive behavior; and, ﬁnally, that the power of
standards not only to intensify competition, but also
to redirect the focus towards comparisons on the scale
is even more dramatic than it may initially appear to
be. The centrality of a proximate standard as a means
of self-evaluation is so great that individuals will even
tolerate a painful upward comparison on the scale to
increase their absolute proximity to the standard. This
latter ﬁnding is somewhat ironic, showing how standards may even channel that inherently relative social
comparison away from speciﬁc human referents towards
one’s absolute standing vis a vis the all-important standard as the ultimate means for self-evaluation in competitive settings.
Limitations
The present studies harnessed a decision-making
methodology in which decision makers were only asked
to respond to hypothetical scenarios. We believe these
results valid, however, sharing Kahneman’s (2000) view
of the beneﬁts inherent in this simple methodology:
‘‘choice. . . is the fruit ﬂy of decision theory. It is a very
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simple case, which contains many essential elements of
much larger problems. As with the fruit ﬂy, we. . . hope
that the principles that govern the simple case will
extend in recognizable form to complex situations’’ (p.
xi, Kahneman, 2000).
Nevertheless, we corroborate our controlled experimental ﬁndings with data on the real-world trading
behavior of competing teams in Major League Baseball.
Of course, such real world analyses are not without their
own caveats. For instance, self-selection may lead naturally competitive decision makers disproportionately to
occupy highly ranked positions in natural environments,
such as in the domain of sport teams. A selection confound is less likely to account for the present results,
however, since highly ranked baseball teams were only
less likely to trade high impact players, but not low
impact players, with their commensurable rivals. Our
ﬁeld data, moreover, do not stand alone but were only
meant to corroborate the results of our decision-making
studies, where a similar behavioral pattern was observed
under conditions of random assignment.
Competitive behavior: social comparison or rational
choice?
The competitive eﬀects observed in our studies raise
intriguing questions regarding the rationality of comparison-based competitive behavior. While any willingness
to forego proﬁt maximization may appear irrational in
the short term, a preference for protecting relative scale
location may sometimes be beneﬁcial in the long term.
For instance, maintaining a rank within the Fortune
500 (as in Study 2) or an especially high rank in Major
League Baseball (as in Study 3) may generate indirect
and direct material beneﬁts. The maintenance of a high
ranking in a one-day poker tournament (Studies 1, 4,
and 5), on the other hand, seems devoid of such beneﬁts
that may justify a costly choice to avoid an upward scale
comparison as potentially rational. In all of the present
studies, moreover, highly ranked competitors never had
to sacriﬁce their potentially proﬁtable absolute scale
standing; instead, they only faced a choice between maximizing proﬁts and preventing a rival from obtaining a
higher rank. In such circumstances, even the arguable
beneﬁts of trading certain short term beneﬁts for the
speculative future fruits of a higher rank do not exist.
We therefore argue that participants’ preferences in
the present studies implicate social comparison process,
as opposed to a rational choice strategy, as the underlying mechanism of the observed competitive behavior.
This conclusion is further supported by the similar
behavioral pattern obtained in the classical competition
condition in Study 4 that, like traditional social comparison studies more generally, does not include explicit
ranking information. In conclusion, therefore, competitive behavior that results from social comparison
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processes may be either rational or irrational, depending
on the circumstances. Such processes are important
motivators of competitive eﬀorts in social settings, but
their operation does not depend on their rationality.
Implications for social comparison processes
The competitive dynamics of upward comparisons in
the task versus those on the scale may well extend to
other phenomena that are facilitated by social comparison processes, including self-esteem (e.g., Collins, 1996;
Smith & Insko, 1987), envy (e.g., Salovey & Rodin,
1986), satisfaction (e.g., Frank, 1985; Schwartz et al.,
2002), and even the search for social comparison information (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle,
1985; Roney & Sorrentino, 1995; Swallow & Kuiper,
1992). For instance, the present analysis suggests that
the propensity of individuals who are insecure about
their scale standing to search for social comparison
information may be inﬂuenced by their proximity to a
standard. In the presence of a standard, such individuals
may increase their pursuit of social comparison information about their referents. Farther away from a standard, however, where the importance of social
comparison diminishes, they may reduce their eﬀorts
to pursue social comparison information.
The dramatic moderating eﬀects of standards on
social comparison and competitive behavior we ﬁnd in
the present studies also indicate some potential limitations of foundational social comparison models such
as the Self-Evaluations Maintenance (SEM) Model
(Beach & Tesser, 2000; Tesser, 1988). To wit, the present
analysis holds constant the relevance of the dimension
(e.g., proﬁt), commensurability of the rivals (e.g., contiguous ranks), and closeness (e.g., ‘‘rivals’’), yet ﬁnds rivals far more competitive when under scale threat in the
proximity of a standard than when they are not. One
may therefore speculate that the impact of SEM dynamics is largely limited to a certain distance, explicit or
implicit, from a standard. The contextual power of standards—namely, the intense competition among rivals
who are proximate to them and the high degree of cooperation of those distant from them—appear to constrain
the potential behavioral variance that could be attributed to those individual diﬀerences associated with the
SEM model. For instance, the number of attributes
you share (e.g., Goethals & Darley, 1977) or your closeness (e.g., Tesser, 1988) to the referent may have quite a
limited eﬀect on competitive behavior in the proximity
of a standard. However, certain attributes or characteristics of the competitors may well impact the willingness
to trade inequality for extra proﬁt because of established
cultural norms (e.g., Henrich, 2000).
Methodologically, the present studies, along with
Garcia et al. (2006), introduce a new paradigm for investigating social comparison processes. Whereas the rank-

order paradigm (Wheeler, 1966) revolutionized social
comparison research by helping researchers understand
the selection of referents (see Suls & Wheeler, 2000),
the present ranking paradigm may similarly make a useful general tool. The ranking paradigm provides quantiﬁable coordinates of the social comparison landscape,
allowing researchers systematically to vary an individual’s distance from standards (e.g., #3 or #103) and referents (e.g., #50 vs. #51 or #45 vs. #55) alike. Rivals,
therefore, must no longer be, categorically, either relevant or irrelevant. Instead, one can use the ranking paradigm to manipulate degrees of relevance. Similarly, the
paradigm would allow decision making researchers who
study power or status to calibrate degrees of relative
power of one individual over another and, simultaneously, degree of absolute power with respect to being
the most or least powerful.
Implications for organizational decision making
Harvard Business School Press recently published a
book entitled ‘‘Forced Ranking: Making Performance
Management Work’’ (Grote, 2005) which champions
the use of rankings to scale employee performance relative to that of their peers instead of using predetermined
goals. Such a system is in fact in use at General Electric.
GE employs a forced ranking model that contains standards such as: (a) exceeding the top 20 percent (e.g.,
leading to ﬁnancial rewards); (b) being in the bottom
10 percent (e.g., leading to termination); and, of course,
(c) the ubiquitous top-of-the-ranking standard. Grote
(2005) in fact asserts that, ‘‘By implementing a forced
ranking procedure, organizations guarantee that managers will diﬀerentiate talent’’ (see HBS Working
Knowledge Newsletter, 2006).
The present studies reveal, however, that forced ranking may negatively aﬀect employees’ willingness to maximize joint gains that will beneﬁt the organization. We
found that in the proximity of standards individuals care
less about performing better in the task and shift their
focus to performing relatively better on the scale.
Employees faced with forced ranking may therefore
become more competitive with each other in the proximity of the various standards promulgated by GE, for
example, especially given their continuous exposure to
scale threat and the obvious importance of the comparison dimension. The natural selection process that disproportionately leads more competitive people to higher
ranks could also exacerbate the competitive behavior
exhibited in the proximity of standards. Ironically, this
process may diminish the tendency to maximize those
joint gains that are highly valuable for the organization.
Thus, while highly ranked employees may be more competitive and productive through simple self-selection, the
championing of forced rankings fails to anticipate
how competitive forces may ultimately inhibit the
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proﬁt-maximizing exchange or pooling of information
and resources among those ‘‘star’’ employees.
At the same time, our ﬁndings also suggest that
forced ranking will not always diminish the likelihood
of maximizing joint gains within the organization. First,
those employees not proximate to any standard will be
less competitive. Second, highly ranked employees
whose rankings are not threatened would be more willing to exchange and pool resources and information.
Third, when highly ranked employees can team together
to improve their absolute standing on the ranking scale,
they may be less concerned about relative scale location.
Altogether, however, our analysis reveals a signiﬁcant
and overlooked weakness of the new and increasingly
popular management system of forced ranking.
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